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The  Community's  common  external  trade  tariff means  that 
it is seen  as  a  single  trading partner by  other world  trading 
powers.  By  volume  of  trade,  it is well  ahead of its partners. 
Averaging  imports  and exports,  the  Community  has  19%  of world 
trade,  compared  to  14%  for  the  United States  and  8%  for  Japan. 
International  trade is a  much  larger share of  GDP  for  the 
Community  and  Japan  than  for  the  United States.  This  fact 
underlines  the  Community's  interest in maintaining an  open 
world  trading system.  It also demonstrates  the  need  for  a 
·- sharpening of  the  competititve edge  of  the  European  economy. 
The  Community  imports  almost half of its energy  needs  and about 
three  quarters of other vital  raw materials.  To  maintain its 
present standard of  living, it must  therefore export finished 
goods. 
In  US  dollar  terms  the  value  of world  trade  increased  16 
times  between  1958  and  1982.  The  increase by  volume  - which 
leaves out the effects of inflation and  monetary  fluctuations 
but also ignores  real  increases  in the  value of increasingly 
elaborate  goods  - is considerably less,  but still substantial. 
Taking  1975  as  the base  figures  of 100,  world  trade by  volume 
stood at only  30  in 1958  and  had  grown  to  130  by  1982.  Two 
distinct periods  can be  identified here.  Between  1958  and 
1972  the  volume  of world  trade  triples in  14  years.  In the 
next 10  years,  it increased only  by half and,  due  to  the 
recession,  actually shrank slightly in 1981 and  1982. 
Community  trade with  the rest of  the world  followed  more  or 
less  the  same  pattern.  European  imports  and exports  increased 
13  times  in value between  1958  and  1982,  slightly below  the 
rate for  world  trade  as  a  whole.  During  this  period,  however, 2
the  shares  in world  trade of  the  Community  (about  23%  in 
1958)  and  the  United States  have  been  eroded  by  the  growing 
economic  power  of  Japan,  the oil-producing countries  and 
newly  industrialized countries in Asia.  The  strength of 
the  dollar has  meant  a  fall in dollar  terms  in  the  value  of 
Community  external  trade  in 1981  and  1982.  In  terms  of  ECUs 
it has  continued  to rise. 
The  Community  is  the principal  trading partner of  the 
United States  (17%  of  US  imports  and  23%  of exports)  and  many 
other countries.  In Western Europe  and  in Africa,  the 
Community  often accounts  for  over half of  the  total  trade  of 
its partners.  All in all,  over half of  Community  trade  takes 
place with other industrialized,  free  economy  countries  and 
about  two  fifths with  the Third World.  The  Americans  here 
today will hence  realise  how  keen  the  E.C.  authorities  are  to 
~aintain free  trade  and  avoid  import controls. 
And  they worry  - we  worry  - about  the attitude of  the 
u.s.  authorities. 
The  relentless rise of  the u.s.  dollar over  the past three 
years provides  a  key  example  of  how  a  European perspective 
might have  produced better economic policies in several 
European countries. 
The  Europeans'  attempts  to  defend  their currencies against 
the  rising dollar have  been  among  the biggest factors  restraining 
domestic policies and  closing off options  for  faster economic 
recovery.  In countries like  the  UK  and Germany  in particular, 
where  fiscal  stimulus was  ruled out for political or long-term 
budgetary  reasons,  the hopes  that reductions  in budget deficits 
and  inflation would  promote  growth  through  dramatic  reductions 
in interest rates were  disappointed.  In part, at least,  this 
was  because  governments  and central banks  chose  to maintain 
tight monetary  conditions. 
The  alternative of  allowi~g a  devaluation would  make  a 
country's  import prices rise and  aggravate its domestic 3
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inflation.  Even if it was  linked into  a  semi-fixed exchange 
rate against its mai~ trading partners,  as  in E.M.S,  a  fall 
in the whole  system against the dollar would  raise  the  prices 
of oil and  other  raw materials,  which  are  denominated  in 
dollars. 
These  concerns  are certainly understable  for  a  single 
European  country.  But  they  are  much  less persuasive  for 
·Europe  as  a  whole.  As  already mentioned,  it is Europe,  not 
the  U.S.,  which  dominates  world  trade  movements.  In  1980, 
the  EEC  accounted  for  24  per cent of  total worldwide  imports 
(excluding  trade within  the Community).  The  U.S.  bought only 
15  per cent of  the rest of  the world's  goods  (and  Japan  9  per 
cent) . 
What  this  means  is that market conditions  in Europe  should 
gctually have  a  bigger  impact on international import prices 
than conditions  in the  U.S.  Even  though  many  prices  may  be 
set in dollars,  i·t will generally pe  supply  and  demand  in the 
world market as  a  whole  which  these prices  ultimately reflect. 
Over  the past  ~ree years,  this is just what.has  been 
happening  to many  European  import prices.  Britain's experience 
is instructive:  Although  the  pound  fell  by  nearly  40  per cent 
against  the dollar, it declined by only  6  per cent against the 
European  currencies  - and  fears  of rapid inflation fuelled 
by  the dollar-based import prices have  not materialised. 
The  fall in the price of oil earlier this year could have 
provided  the  clinching evidence against the  "dollar illusion" 
that dollar-denominated prices were  somehow  sacrosanct and 
that domestic sacrifices were  worthwhile  to limit the rise of 
the  dollar. 
The  official price of oil fell  from  $34  a  barrel,  where 
it stabilised in October  1981,  to  $29  in March  this year  - a 
decline of  17.2 per cent.  In  the  same  period the dollar rose 
against  the  ECU  (a  representative "cocktail"  of all the EEC's 
currencies)  by  17.5 per cent.  Thus  the fall in the dollar 
price of oil exactly offset the dollar's rise against the  ECU. 4
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European  governments  may  never  be  persuaded by  evidence 
of  this kind  to  recognise  both  their interdependence  and  their 
potential ability to.provide  the world with  economic  leadership. 
So  far  there is no  sign,  for  instance,  of  a  European  initiative 
to offer Opec  oil purchase contracts  denominated  in ECUs  instead 
of dollars. 
What  can be  said with  confidence,  however,  is that Europe 
is still, despite its long  run  problems,  the  greatest single 
influence on  the international  trading  economy  - so  a  healthy 
and  lasting world economic  recovery will  simply  be  impossible 
unless  Europe  joins in more  convincingly  soon.  Meanwhile, 
the  ECU  is gradually  increasing its scope  and  meaning,  the 
E.M.S.  is getting  a  solid look  about it and  the  U.K.  will 
presumably  join in at sometime  soon,  I  hope. 
None  of  these  things will  harm America's  basic interests. 